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Recent statements from key South Korean entertainment industry associations— the Korea Entertainment Management Association (KEMA), the Korea Entertainment Producers Association (KEPA), and the Korea Music Content Association (KMCA)—have highlighted concerns over allegations of “tampering” in the ongoing dispute involving former ADOR CEO Min Hee-jin, HYBE, and NewJeans. These statements reflect industry-wide anxieties about contract stability but carry limited direct authority. This article details the content of their statements, analyzes their potential influence, and transitions to the more substantive legal matter: the non-compete clause in Min Hee-jin’s shareholders’ agreement with HYBE, as outlined in the February 2026 first-instance court ruling.

All information is drawn from public statements, court documents, and verified reports, presented factually without advocacy.

Statements from KEMA, KEPA, and KMCA

KEMA’s Statement

KEMA, an industry trade association representing entertainment management companies, issued a statement on March 3, 2026, through its Special Disciplinary Mediation Ethics Committee. The statement addressed media reports alleging that Min Hee-jin instructed NewJeans members to hold a press conference announcing contract termination and contacted overseas investors to potentially take control of the group while their exclusive contracts with ADOR (a HYBE subsidiary) were still active.

Key excerpts from KEMA’s statement:

• “If these reports are true, such actions would be considered a disruption of order violating the principle of good faith, undermining the sound morals and development of the entertainment industry. We express deep concern and regret over this.”
• “If it is true that the former entertainment company CEO involved in this dispute intervened behind the scenes in the termination of artists’ contracts and participated in the procedures, this constitutes one of the most chronic illegal and unfair acts in the entertainment industry, a typical case of tampering.”
• “In this regard, Min Hee-jin must provide a clear explanation, and if these actions are confirmed, she must take appropriate responsibility and issue an official apology.”
• “The legal dispute between HYBE and Min Hee-jin should not be reduced to a personal conflict or financial matter. If this issue is prematurely covered up for the sake of external image management in order to avoid confusion, future attempts, investments, contractual order, and trust within the industry may be discouraged, making it difficult for any contract or system to operate stably.”
• “To foster a healthy environment where cultural and artistic workers can work with sound beliefs, the tampering allegations related to NewJeans must be thoroughly investigated and resolved.”

KEMA’s statement also referenced specific allegations, such as Min Hee-jin mobilizing NewJeans members for meetings with international figures (e.g., from the Japanese racing scene and Complex China in Hong Kong), calling these potential infringements on artists’ personality rights if proven.

KEPA’s Statement

KEPA, focused on entertainment producers, released a statement on February 13, 2026, following the Seoul Central District Court’s ruling on the put option case. The statement expressed regret over the court’s decision that the shareholders’ agreement was not properly terminated, warning that it could signal a “free pass” for tampering attempts.

Key excerpts from KEPA’s statement:

• “Our association has repeatedly warned, whenever controversies over the termination of exclusive contracts and suspicions of tampering have arisen, that ‘if contracts and trust collapse, the very foundation of the industry will be shaken.'”
• “This ruling sends a dangerous message that even if someone plots tampering, they may be given a free pass as long as it is not carried out or is discovered before execution.”
• “Tampering is not a simple contract dispute. It is an attempt to seize the fruits of joint efforts and a destructive act that uproots trust in the industry.”
• “We are concerned that this ruling will only fuel distrust rather than take away anxiety in the field.”

KEPA emphasized the broader implications for industry norms, particularly in high-profile cases involving artist contracts and agency conflicts.

KMCA’s Statement

KMCA, representing music content entities, issued statements in December 2024 and February 2026. The December 13, 2024, statement addressed tampering allegations directly, while the February 20, 2026, statement echoed regrets over the court ruling similar to KEPA’s.

Key excerpts from KMCA’s December 2024 statement:

• “We are gravely concerned about recent tampering attempts that have disrupted the industry. This underscores the urgent need for action.”
• “Shortly after the FiftyFifty incident, the allegations of tampering by former CEO Min Hee-jin… are very concerned in that it revealed how rampant tampering is in the popular music industry, regardless of its authenticity or not.”
• “We urge Min Hee-jin to provide a clear and factual account regarding the recent tampering accusations reported in the media… Do not avoid with provocative and vague answers. Please reveal the truth to end the current controversy.”
• To NewJeans: “We guarantee the faithful implementation of the exclusive contract and consult with the agency through a sincere dialogue, but if we fail to reach an agreement, we must humbly wait for the judgment of the judiciary. It is vital for NewJeans to remember their responsibility as K-pop representatives and to act with caution in the public eye.”

From the February 2026 statement:

“We have seen the first-instance ruling between HYBE and former CEO Min Hee-jin and, as an organization dedicated to the development and promotion of the K-pop industry, we express our deep concern.”

Similar to KEPA, it raised fears that the ruling could legitimize tampering if not executed. KMCA also urged music shows and award programs to boycott activities involving groups linked to tampering disputes, though this is advisory rather than binding.

What These Associations Can Actually Influence or Do

KEMA, KEPA, and KMCA are self-regulatory trade bodies without governmental or judicial authority. They cannot:

• Impose criminal penalties or fines.
• Revoke licenses, ban individuals from the industry, or enforce contract terminations.
• Directly control broadcast networks (e.g., KBS, MBC, SBS), global streaming platforms (e.g., Spotify, YouTube), or domestic platforms (e.g., Melon, Genie).
• Override court rulings or intervene in ongoing litigation.

Their primary functions include:

• Mediating disputes through internal committees (e.g., KEMA’s Awards and Ethics Committee).
• Issuing public statements to promote ethical standards, particularly around exclusive contracts and tampering.
• Advocating for industry norms, such as contract stability as a foundation for trainee investments and risk management.

Influence is largely informal and reputational:

• Industry Pressure: Public labeling of behavior as unethical can affect agency cooperation, sponsorships, event invitations, and award show participation.
• Soft Power: In interconnected sectors, alignment among major agencies could indirectly impact bookings or collaborations, but this is not enforceable.
• Broader Impact: Statements may encourage regulatory scrutiny (e.g., from the Fair Trade Commission) or influence public perception, potentially leading to backlash or support.
• Limitations: Global platforms operate under distribution agreements and remove content only for legal violations. Domestic broadcasters prioritize relationships but decide lineups independently. Any “ban” would require legal grounds, not association disapproval.

In practice, these statements amplify concerns but do not resolve disputes. Outcomes depend on litigation, such as HYBE’s ongoing claims against Min Hee-jin.

Transition to the Weightier Issue: Min Hee-jin’s Non-Compete Clause

While industry associations focus on tampering allegations, the core legal constraint on Min Hee-jin’s future activities stems from her shareholders’ agreement with HYBE, particularly the non-compete provisions. The February 12, 2026, Seoul Central District Court ruling (Case No. 2024GaHap110222) ordered HYBE to pay approximately KRW 28.8 billion in put option proceeds (KRW 25.6 billion to Min Hee-jin, plus amounts to co-plaintiffs), finding the agreement was not properly terminated. However, the ruling did not directly address the non-compete’s enforceability post-resignation.

Structure of the Shareholders’ Agreement

Executed on March 27, 2023, the agreement (detailed in court Appendix 1) transferred about 20% of ADOR shares to Min Hee-jin and associates as compensation for NewJeans’ success. Key provisions:

• Five-Year Service Obligation: Min Hee-jin was required to serve as CEO and inside director until November 2, 2026 (five years from ADOR’s November 2, 2021, incorporation).
• Role Protection: HYBE must maintain her position unless specific grounds for removal exist.
• Put Option: Allowed sale of up to 75% of shares at a 13x multiple of ADOR’s operating profit, exercisable from November 3, 2024.
• Non-Compete Clause (Article 10.3(e)): Prohibits engaging in similar businesses, establishing/investing in competitors, or advising them, during the service period and thereafter, while the agreement remains valid or shares are held.
  • Applies post-2026 service term.
  • For remaining 25% shares after put option, disposal requires HYBE consent; otherwise, non-compete continues.
• Non-Solicitation (Likely Article 10.3(f)): Prohibits soliciting employees or artists.
• Other Duties: Article 10.3(a) requires loyalty and due diligence; Article 10.3(c) mandates notifications on issues like artist contracts; Article 10.3(d) relates to control or independence attempts.

Min Hee-jin objected to the non-compete in December 2023, seeking amendments, but negotiations failed.

Timeline and Court Findings

• August 27, 2024: Removed as CEO but retained as director.
• October 17, 2024: Reappointed as director.
• November 19, 2024: Exercised put option.
• November 20, 2024: Resigned as director.
• Court Ruling: Agreement not terminated on contractual (e.g., violations of Articles 2.3, 10.3(a)/(d), 12.9/12.10) or statutory grounds (e.g., breach of trust). HYBE’s call option exercise was invalid. The court noted the agreement’s financial ties, estimating Min Hee-jin’s 2025 put value at KRW 100 billion.

The ruling construed the non-compete as post-service and tied to remaining shares/financial interests.

How Resignation Affects the Non-Compete

Resignation does not automatically invalidate the clause:

• Service period incomplete (ends November 2026).
• Agreement remains valid per court.
• Non-compete extends “thereafter” and links to shareholding.

Potential legal complexities:

• Enforceability Factors: Korean courts assess non-competes for reasonableness (duration, scope, geography, compensation proportionality). Overly broad restrictions may be narrowed or invalidated under public policy.
• Arguments for Enforcement: Voluntary resignation breaches 5-year commitment; clause protects HYBE’s investments; tied to substantial equity (KRW 25.6 billion payout).
• Arguments Against: Service interrupted by removal; post-put option, no ongoing role/shareholding justifies restraint; scope (domestic/international similar businesses) may be excessive.
• Practical Steps: HYBE must sue for breach, seeking injunction/damages. Court would evaluate if new activities (e.g., OOAK Records) qualify as “competing.”

No separate ruling on non-compete enforceability exists; it would require new litigation.

Conclusion

KEMA, KEPA, and KMCA’s statements underscore industry fears of tampering eroding contract trust but exert only informal influence, lacking enforcement power. The non-compete clause, embedded in a still-valid shareholders’ agreement, poses a more concrete barrier to Min Hee-jin’s activities until at least November 2026 or resolution. Outcomes hinge on future court interpretations, with no final determination yet.